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Abstract 
In the past decade or so there has been a substantial rise in the indebtedness and 
debt-servicing obligations of Australian households. This has been accompanied 
by a trend increase in labour force participation (LFP) for women and more 
recently for men. Microeconomic data show a clear positive correlation between 
indebtedness and LFP. This paper models the LFP decision of prime-age 
Australian women and men accounting for the influence of debt and assets along 
with a range of other variables found to be important in the literature. The potential 
two-way causation between debt and labour supply is also addressed. 
Data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
Survey are used as it contains recent and detailed data on household wealth along 
with extensive labour market and demographic data. A cross-section model of LFP 
is estimated using the detailed measures of household debts and assets available in 
Wave 2 of the survey. In addition, a panel model, using only measures of   
owner-occupied housing debt and assets, is estimated using all five currently 
available waves. 
Evidence is presented to suggest that LFP is determined by several factors, 
including family structure, education, health and indebtedness. In general, most of 
the effect of indebtedness on an individual’s probability of participation in the 
labour force is captured through the household debt-servicing ratio, although the 
level of owner-occupied mortgage debt appears important for men. Also, the panel 
results suggest that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity across individuals is 
important when examining the influence of debt on labour supply. 
JEL Classification Numbers: D12, D14, D91, J21 
Keywords: labour force participation, household debt, credit constraints, HILDA  
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LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND HOUSEHOLD DEBT 
Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell and Rebecca Edwards 
1.  Introduction 
In the past decade or so there has been a substantial rise in the indebtedness and 
debt-servicing obligations of Australian households. This has occurred at the same 
time as a trend increase in labour force participation (LFP) for women and more 
recently for men. Microeconomic data show a clear positive correlation between 
indebtedness and LFP. This paper explores the role of household debt in the LFP 
decisions of prime-age Australian women and men. It accounts for the role of 
assets in offsetting the impact of higher debt burdens on labour supply. The 
estimation methodology also allows for the potential two-way causation between 
debt and labour supply. 
Data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
Survey, a panel of Australian households and individuals from 2001 to 2005, show 
that those with owner-occupied mortgage debt have a higher participation rate than 
those without (Table 1). For example, over 2001–2005, 79 per cent of women aged 
36–50 years with debt participated in the labour force compared to 69 per cent of 
those without debt. A similar difference was apparent for men of that age group. 
Table 1: LFP by Owner-occupied Mortgage Debt and Age 
Percentage in the labour force, HILDA 2001–2005 
  Has no debt  Has debt 
Women 
Aged 25–35 years  68.7  73.1 
Aged 36–50 years  68.5  79.3 
Men 
Aged 25–35 years  91.6  96.5 
Aged 36–50 years  85.5  95.6 
Source:  HILDA Survey 2001–2005, Release 5.0 
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This paper seeks to extend our understanding of labour market decisions by 
considering the effect of debt and its servicing obligations on participation. 
Existing studies are generally framed in terms of a life-cycle model, where the 
statistical significance of debt in a labour supply regression can be interpreted as 
evidence that credit constraints bind. If credit constraints are binding, debt is 
expected to induce an increase in labour supply as additional labour generates 
additional income which can be used to relax the credit constraints. Most   
studies concentrate on partnered women, with a significant effect of debt on 
participation generally found. While this paper closely follows Fortin (1995) and 
Bottazzi (2004), our analysis includes tenants as well as home owners and single, 
as well as partnered, women. In addition, we analyse male participation. Like 
Bottazzi and Fortin, this paper is one of the few that assess the potential 
endogeneity of debt in the LFP decision. 
The HILDA Survey is used to estimate separate probit models of LFP for men and 
women. Wave 2 of the survey – corresponding to 2002 – contains full balance 
sheet information on household debts and assets including owner-occupied 
housing, investment property and financial assets. Using these data, a cross-section 
is first analysed. The endogeneity of debt is considered using an instrumental 
variables approach exploiting available data on house prices, year of house 
purchase and ownership status. In contrast to earlier Australian studies, we exploit 
the panel data in the HILDA Survey to control for unobserved heterogeneity. In the 
panel, the effects of owner-occupied housing debt and assets are considered; data 
on non-owner occupied housing assets and debt are only available for 2002. 
In line with existing studies, we find that family structure, education and health 
status are important determinants of LFP. Indebtedness is also found to have a 
significant effect on current LFP. We typically find that the debt-servicing ratio has 
a positive and significant effect on the probability of LFP. The effect is generally 
larger for women than for men. While it seems plausible that debt and LFP are 
jointly determined (particularly over the longer term), there is no statistical 
evidence that debt depends on current LFP. This may reflect the fact that 
borrowing decisions associated with large purchases are often re-examined only 
infrequently and, therefore, that they can be treated as pre-determined when 
making current LFP decisions. 
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2.  Literature Review 
2.1  Previous Empirical Findings 
A series of earlier papers have examined the relationship between labour supply 
and debt in a range of countries using cross-section and panel data. For example, 
Fortin (1993, 1995) and Worswick (1999) study Canada, Del Boca and   
Lusardi (2003) study Italy, Aldershof, Alessie and Kapteyn (1999) study the 
Netherlands, Bottazzi (2004) studies the United Kingdom and O’Brien and   
Hawley (1986) and Shack-Marquez and Wascher (1986) study the United States. 
With one exception (Shack-Marquez and Wascher 1986), the findings suggest that 
debt and its servicing obligations have a positive and significant effect on labour 
supply. Fortin (1995) and Aldershof et al (1999) find that the effect of debt 
generally outweighs the negative effect that young children have on female labour 
supply, while Bottazzi finds the overall effect remains negative. The focus of   
most of these papers is on housing debt and its influence on partnered female  
labour supply. 
The intertemporal life-cycle model is the commonly used framework in these 
studies. The significance of debt for labour supply has been interpreted as evidence 
that credit constraints bind for some individuals. Intuitively, binding credit 
constraints can be expected to increase labour supply since working is a means by 
which such constraints can be eased. For example, some individuals may not be 
able to borrow any funds from financial institutions, while for others, banks may 
impose an upper bound on the amount of credit available. However, in both cases 
the individual may be able to relax these credit constraints by working. Those with 
existing debt may, at some point, have made a decision to work in order to access 
credit, absent some alternative income source. They may also find that credit 
constraints bind in the face of an unexpected income or expenditure shock. In this 
case also, increasing labour supply provides a means to ease the credit constraint 
and may be less costly than renegotiating a loan or selling assets.1
                                           
1  Other papers assess the importance of credit constraints by using indicators such as whether 
the person has little or no liquid or total wealth (see, for example, Dau-Schmidt 1997 and 
Domeij and Flodén 2006) or whether the person has been denied access to credit (see, in 
particular, Jappelli 1990). 
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In Fortin (1995) and Bottazzi (2004), credit constraints are introduced into the 
model through the addition of a mortgage-related borrowing constraint, which is 
assumed to hold in every period.2 This style of model is also appropriate to the 
Australian case. Australian banks typically require that scheduled loan repayments 
not exceed a nominated proportion of a borrower’s regular income. This proportion 
has traditionally been set at around 30 per cent of gross income, though in more 
recent years a higher ratio has been used, particularly for higher income earners. 
Aldershof  et al (1999) incorporate a more general borrowing constraint.   
Del Boca and Lusardi (2003), on the other hand, model the labour force and 
mortgage decisions in a simultaneous equation system. To identify the direction of 
the effect between debt and LFP, they exploit two exogenous changes in the Italian 
mortgage market, between 1989 and 1993, that served to expand consumers’ 
access to credit. 
Each of the above papers includes a role for borrowing constraints.   
Dau-Schmidt (1997) suggests that debt also imposes a second type of constraint, in 
that ongoing debt-servicing obligations represent an expenditure commitment that 
may be difficult to change at short notice in the face of an adverse shock. For 
example, while a home owner might ultimately sell their home and move to 
cheaper housing, there may be limited scope to do this in the short run, particularly 
in the face of significant adjustment costs. 
This literature intersects with studies concerned with the effect of the housing 
tenure decision on labour force supply. These models are not only concerned with 
home owners, who may be constrained by debt holdings, but also those planning to 
purchase a home who may be constrained by the need to accumulate a down 
payment. Yoshikawa and Ohtake (1989) develop a model for Japan and find that a 
down-payment constraint induced women planning to purchase a home to work 
more than other women. 
Some Australian studies have included a role for housing debt or home ownership 
as an explanator for LFP, using cross-section or panel data. Shamsuddin (1998), 
using cross-section data, finds that total mortgage debt has a significant positive 
                                           
2  Bottazzi argues that this is reasonable as long as refinancing is possible; on application to 
refinance, the bank is able to reassess income and reapply the mortgage borrowing constraint. 
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effect on the LFP and hours worked of immigrant women. Drago, Wooden and 
Black (2006), in a panel study using HILDA data, find that the debt-to-income 
ratio has a significant and positive effect on the propensity for long hours of work. 
However, Kidd and Ferko (2001) find no significant effect of home ownership on 
participation and hours worked in an investigation of the effect of the gender wage 
gap on employment. 
Two Australian studies examine this issue using macroeconomic data.   
Connolly (1996) finds a negative correlation between female full-time LFP and the 
affordability of home and consumer loans. Connolly and Kirk (1996) find that the 
affordability of consumer loans and housing costs each affect the LFP of older 
Australian men. 
2.2  The Treatment of Endogeneity in the Literature 
The discussion above suggests that while indebtedness may prompt individuals to 
supply more labour, debt may also depend on the LFP decision, as financial 
institutions often include employment or current income in their lending criteria. 
The endogenous determination of debt might also arise as households 
simultaneously choose a future path for work and debt, say in relation to plans to 
purchase a home or start a family. However, the case for endogenous debt is not 
clear cut. In the face of temporary shocks to income (or expenditure), a household 
might generally treat debt as pre-determined, especially if changing debt quickly 
involves a large adjustment cost, and be more willing to adjust labour first. 
Despite the bias that can occur in the presence of endogeneity, few papers test or 
control for it. Del Boca and Lusardi (2003) are a notable exception in that they 
model the participation and mortgage decisions simultaneously. Fortin (1993) finds 
evidence that mortgage payments are exogenous to the labour force decision using 
Canadian data. Bottazzi (2004) tests for the endogeneity of the mortgage constraint 
on LFP in her UK study using house prices as an instrumental variable and also 
finds that mortgage payments are exogenous to the labour force decision.   
Section 3.2 details the identification strategy used in this paper to control for the 
potential endogeneity. Testing suggests that debt is exogenous to current LFP. This 
result is discussed in Section 5.2. 
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3.  The Modelling Strategies 
Using the available HILDA Survey data, we estimate both a cross-section and a 
panel model for LFP. Within the cross-section framework, we test for the potential 
endogeneity using an instrumental variables approach. 
3.1  Cross-section Model 
The relationship between debt and LFP is modelled using cross-section data from 
the 2002 HILDA Survey, which allows us to make use of the more detailed 
household balance sheet information collected in that year. The propensity to 
participate in the labour force is modelled as a function of a vector of Assets, of 
Debts and of personal and family characteristics, X. As only the outcome of the 
LFP decision is observed, a latent variable approach is used. The dependent 
variable, LFP, is defined as 1 if the individual is employed or looking for work in 
the week prior to the interview and 0 otherwise, and LFP* is the latent variable: 






+ + + =
i i
i i i i i
LFP LFP
u LFP γ Debts γ Assets β X
More specifically, the probability of LFP is modelled using a probit specification: 
  ) ( ) , , | 1 ( 2 1 γ Debts γ Assets β X Debts Assets X i i i i i i i LFP P + + = = Φ  (2) 
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution. 
Consistent with the literature, we choose a model of individual LFP. The literature 
often finds more significant effects associated with the decision to work rather than 
for the decision between positive hours (Heckman 1993). Rather than estimating a 
model for the household jointly, the labour force status and income of the 
individual’s partner are included as explanatory variables. 
Assets may be an important determinant of LFP as they capture a potential wealth 
effect and may also better capture the effects of non-labour income. In addition, 
asset holdings may reduce the effect of any credit constraints. 
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3.2  Accounting for the Potential Endogeneity 
The potential endogeneity of debt in the LFP decision, discussed in Section 2.2, is 
tested using a two-step instrumental variables approach, as suggested by   
Rivers and Vuong (1988).3 Along with Equation (1), the system of equations 
includes a reduced-form equation for Debts: 
  i i i i i v + + + = 3 2 1 δ Z δ Assets δ X Debts  (3) 
Debts are modelled as a function of all of the exogenous variables in Equation (1) 
and a set of instrumental variables, Z. These instrumental variables, Z, appear in 
Equation (3) but not Equation (1) and are used to isolate the variation in Debts that 
is exogenous to LFP. The test developed by Rivers and Vuong will find that debt is 
endogenous to LFP if u and ν are correlated. The instruments used are discussed in 
Section 5.2. 
The instrumental variables strategy provides a solution to the potential endogeneity 
if two conditions are satisfied. The first, which can be tested explicitly, is that the 
instruments must be correlated with Debts. The second condition is that the 
instruments must not be correlated with u, the error term in Equation (1). In 
general, this second condition must be maintained by assumption. However, where 
there are more instruments available than potentially endogenous variables, an 
overidentification test can be performed to assess whether the instruments are 
correlated with u. 
3.3  Exploiting the Longitudinal Data 
A panel model is also estimated using the longitudinal data from the HILDA 
Survey. These data enable each individual’s unobservable and time-invariant 
characteristics to be controlled for, although the available assets and debt data are 
less comprehensive than for the cross-section model. Ignoring this unobserved 
individual heterogeneity can potentially result in biased estimates (Baltagi 2005). 
                                           
3  While accumulated assets may be a result of previous labour force activity, it is reasonable to 
assume that assets are exogenous to current labour force status. In any case, there are no 
reliable instruments available to test for the endogeneity of assets. 
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Both a fixed-effects and a random-effects model are used to explicitly account for 
the longitudinal nature of the data. The model is similar to Equation (1) above but 
with data available for each individual i over time t: 
 
] 0 * [ 1
* 2 1
> =
+ + + + =
it it
it i it it it it
LFP LFP
u c LFP γ Debts γ Assets β X
 (4) 
where the individual effect ci captures the unmeasured characteristics of each 
individual that are stable over the sample period. These might include risk 
preferences, attitudes to, and aptitudes for, work, or unobserved permanent 
components in wages (Chamberlain 1984). Both methodologies, fixed- and 
random-effects, ‘eliminate’ ci from the estimating equation and so the potential 
bias from the unobserved heterogeneity is eliminated. Baltagi (2005) and 
Wooldridge (2002) each provide a detailed exposition of both methodologies, 
along with the form for the probability model as per Equation (2). 
For the fixed-effects estimation, a logit functional form is assumed and a 
conditional fixed-effects logit is estimated. By conditioning on Xi, Assetsi, Debtsi 
and ci, and by excluding those individuals that are always in or always out of the 
labour force, β,  γ1  and  γ2 are consistently estimated and the influence of ci is 
eliminated.4
For the random-effects model, a probit functional form is used. To consistently 
estimate β, γ1 and γ2, it is assumed that the Xit, Assetsit and Debtsit are independent 
of ci, as well as uit, for all i and t.5 Only if this assumption holds is ci ‘eliminated’ 
from the estimating equation. It is a strong assumption but can be tested using a 
Hausman test of the random- and fixed-effects estimates. If the random-effects 
point estimates are not found to differ from the fixed-effects estimates, random 
effects is preferred as it is more efficient. 
                                           
4  Fixed-effects probits cannot be estimated because a conditional distribution that does not 
depend on ci cannot be found (Wooldridge 2002). 
5 That  is,  ) , 0 ( ~ , ,
2
c it it it i Normal c σ Assets Debts X . 
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The advantage of fixed-effects estimation is that it produces consistent estimates, 
and indicates how people change their LFP in response to changes in debt over 
time. However, only observations on individuals who change labour force status 
during the sample period can be included in the estimation. As a result, only a  
sub-sample of less than a quarter of the size of the full sample of women and 
around 10 per cent of the full sample of men are available for estimation.6 In 
addition, no time-invariant characteristics may be entered in the model. 
On the other hand, the random-effects model is favoured because it can be 
estimated on the full sample, and Baltagi (2005) argues that random-effects is 
appropriate if the sample is drawn randomly from a large population and is broadly 
representative. This is the type of sample available from the HILDA Survey. In 
addition, the random-effects estimates can be easily used to examine the marginal 
effect of debt on LFP probabilities. 
4.  The Data 
Data are sourced from the first five waves of the HILDA Survey (Release 5.0).7 
Along with detailed information on employment, income, housing and housing 
wealth available in each wave, Wave 2 contains a detailed module on households’ 
holdings of assets and outstanding debts. The survey is broadly representative of 
the Australian population and population weights are available to correct for the 
most obvious differences. See Goode and Watson (2007) for information on 
sampling, response rates and attrition. 
In this paper, the LFP of women and men are analysed separately due to their 
distinct labour supply patterns.8 Full-time students and the self-employed are 
                                           
6  Tests of the characteristics of these sub-samples show that those who vary their labour force 
status are quite different from those who remain in or out of the labour force. For example, 
those women who changed status were more likely to have a partner, young children, less 
debt or no university education. Men who changed status were less likely to have debt, a 
partner, university education, English proficiency or be Australian born. 
7  The in-confidence unit record data are used. 
8  A considerably larger proportion of prime-age males participate in the labour force compared 
to women. Empirical studies have found that men’s LFP is relatively wage inelastic   
(Pencavel 1986) whereas women are generally found to have a more flexible attachment to 
the labour force (Killingsworth and Heckman 1986; Birch 2005). 
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excluded as their labour market attachment is likely to be influenced by different 
factors from those which affect the general population. For the cross-section, the 
sample is restricted to those aged between 25 and 50 years; this excludes those 
approaching retirement age, whose participation decision might be influenced by 
additional factors such as asset accumulation for retirement, health and so forth. 
This leaves a sample of 2 999 women and 2 568 men, after removing those with 
missing data. 
For the panel analysis, an unbalanced panel of individuals who responded to the 
survey in at least two waves is used. To match the selection of those aged between  
25 and 50 years in the cross-section, the panel sample includes individuals aged 
between 24 and 49 years in wave 1 (in 2001) and progresses through to those aged 
between 28 and 53 years in wave 5 (in 2005). A similar selection criterion was 
used in Booth and Wood (2006). This leaves a sample of 3  350 women and   
2 822 men, after removing those with missing data. Approximately 86 per cent of 
women in the sample were present in at least three waves, and 50 per cent were in 
all five waves. For men, the figures are 85 per cent and 48 per cent respectively. 
4.1  Description of Variables 
Demographic variables relevant to life-cycle considerations and human-capital are 
likely to be important influences on LFP decisions; these are described in 
Appendix A. Labour income – earned through wages, salaries or business – is not 
included as an explanator since the wage offer is not observed for those who are 
not working. However, each individual’s potential wage can be captured through 
the set of individual characteristics in the model (such as education and labour 
force history). 
While the non-labour income variables are also outlined in Appendix A, the family 
tax benefit variables (FTB A and FTB B) warrant clarification. For each 
individual, the family tax benefit that would be due to the household if they did not 
work is imputed.9 The rationale for constructing these potential benefits is to 
account for an individual’s basic reservation wage – that is, the income that they 
                                           
9  The counterfactual family tax benefit was constructed by adapting code supplied by the 
Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, which applies the historical 
benefit rules as published by the Department of Families, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs (<http://www.facs.gov.au/guides_acts/fag/faguide-3/faguide-3.6.html>). 
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could expect to receive from the government given their family characteristics if 
they were not working.10
For the panel, only owner-occupied mortgage debt is available. Detailed data on 
debt (and assets) were only collected in one year of the survey, 2002, and are used 
for the cross-section analysis. For the cross-section, the vector of Debts includes 
the owner-occupied mortgage debt and other debt of that individual’s household. 
Other debt combines debts on investment properties, credit card debts, HECS, car 
loans, overdrafts and other personal loans. Statistical tests show that these variables 
can be combined. 
Debts are included in three ways. First, each debt variable is specified in levels. 
Second, because the ability to pay is likely to be important for LFP, the   
debt-to-income ratio is also included for both the owner-occupied mortgage and 
other debt. Finally, since data on yearly repayments on the owner-occupied 
mortgage are available, these are included as a ratio of household income 
(excluding the labour income of the individual). This variable is described as the 
debt-servicing ratio. 
It is important to note that household income used in the denominator of both the 
debt-to-income ratios and the debt-servicing ratio excludes the labour income of 
the individual but includes the partner’s labour income. Intuitively, these ratios 
provide a guide as to whether the household can or cannot service their debt under 
the scenario that the individual does not work. For those with no debt, these ratios 
are set to zero. For those with no household income (exclusive of the labour 
income of the individual), the ratio is set equal to the numerator (which is debt or 
repayments depending on the ratio in question).11 Throughout the paper, when we 
refer to household income we are referring to this measure, that is, household 
income excluding the labour income of the individual but including the partner’s 
labour income. 
                                           
10 Other potential government benefits, such as unemployment benefits, are not imputed in a 
similar manner due to the complexity associated with such a task. Most government payments 
are means or asset tested and are strongly related to other demographic factors. As a result, 
their effects should be captured elsewhere in the model. 
11 This is equivalent to assigning those individuals with negative or zero household income 
(exclusive of the labour income of the individual) with one dollar of household income.   
Drago et al (2006) adopt a similar approach. 
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The square-root of the debt-servicing ratio is also included to account for this 
variable’s non-linearity. The non-linearity is the result of large ratios for those 
individuals where household income is very small or zero.12 Repayment 
information is not available for non-mortgage debts. 
Two measures of household assets are included separately in the cross-section 
model: financial and non-financial assets. Financial assets are the sum of equity 
and cash investments, trust funds and household bank accounts. These should be 
relatively liquid and thus may provide readily available funds in the case of an 
adverse shock. Superannuation assets are excluded because they are illiquid, 
particularly for the age group under consideration. Non-financial assets include the 
home, other property values, vehicles and collectibles.13 In the panel, only the 
value of the owner-occupied home is available.14
4.2  Descriptive Statistics 
Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix A present the summary statistics for the cross-
section and panel samples. Men have a higher attachment to the labour force, with 
92 per cent participating compared to around 73 per cent of women. 
More detailed summary statistics for assets and debt are shown in Table 2. In 
Wave 2, median owner-occupied mortgage debt is approximately $10 000. This 
rises to $100 000 among those with a mortgage (not shown). The proportion with 
an owner-occupied mortgage and the median outstanding owner-occupied 
mortgage debt are each slightly higher in the panel sample. This likely reflects the 
increase in indebtedness and in the number of indebted home owners over the first 
half of this decade. 
                                           
12 The effects of this non-linearity can be observed in the average ratios which are very large 
(presented in Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix A). 
13 Net business wealth was considered. However, its inclusion made no qualitative difference. 
14 Note that in the cross-section model, imputed wealth data are used. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics – Assets and Debts 
Percentile  Percentile 
  25 Median 75 
Per cent with 
positive debt 
or assets  25 Median 75 




  Wave 2; 2 999 observations  Panel; 13 672 observations 
Owner-occupied mortgage 
debt outstanding ($’000) 
0 8.0  98.0 50.9  0  12.0  110.0  51.6 
Owner-occupied mortgage 
debt-to-income ratio 
0 0.2  2.0 50.9  0  0.2  2.2  51.6 
Debt-servicing ratio  0  0  0.2 48.2  0  0  0.2  49.0 
Other debt ($’000)  0  3.6  18.5 67.7 na  na  na  na 
Other debt-to-income ratio  0  0.1 0.5 67.7  na na  na  na 
Value of owner-occupied 
home ($’000)
(a)
– – –  –  0  200.0  350.0  69.4 
Non-financial assets ($’000)  38.0  213.5 378.0 95.8  na na  na  na 
Financial assets ($’000)  1.2  7.0  27.4 98.3  na  na  na  na 
Men 
  Wave 2; 2 568 observations  Panel; 11 374 observations 
Owner-occupied mortgage 
debt outstanding ($’000) 
0 10.0  100.0 51.4  0  19.0  115.0  52.5 
Owner-occupied mortgage 
debt-to-income ratio 
0 0.3  4.1 51.4  0  0.5  4.5  52.5 
Debt-servicing ratio  0  0  0.4 48.5  0  0  0.5  49.6 
Other debt ($’000)  0  4.6  19.0 68.3 na  na  na  na 
Other debt-to-income ratio  0  0.2 1.1 68.3  na na  na  na 
Value of owner-occupied 
home ($’000)
(a)
– – –  –  0  200.0  350.0  68.5 
Non-financial assets ($’000)  30.0  203.8 361.5 96.5  na na  na  na 
Financial assets ($’000)  1.3  7.0  29.2 97.7  na  na  na  na 
Notes:  Full descriptions of all variables are available in Appendix A, Table A1. 
  (a) Summary statistics for the value of the owner-occupied home are not reported for the cross-section as it 
is captured in non-financial assets.  
 
The median ratio of owner-occupied mortgage debt to household income is   
20 per cent for women overall and 210 per cent for women with a mortgage, using 
the panel data. For men, the equivalent ratios are 50 per cent and 430 per cent 
respectively. The differences between men and women for the debt-to-income and 
debt-servicing ratios at the median (and also at the 75
th percentile) reflect that men 
generally have a lower household income. This is because men often earn more 
 14 
than their partners, and our measure of household income excludes the individual’s 
own labour income. 
Around half of the sample does not make any mortgage repayments. Among those 
with mortgage repayments, the median debt-servicing ratio (where the 
denominator is household income, excluding individual labour income) is 0.23 for 
women and 0.46 for men in the panel sample (not reported in the table). For 
women, around 5 per cent of the sample has a debt-servicing ratio equal to or 
greater than 1, that is, their household income is less than the amount of annual 
housing debt repayments paid. In contrast, for men, around 13 per cent have a 
debt-servicing ratio equal to or greater than 1, reflecting their higher labour income 
relative to their partner. 
Higher rates of LFP are associated with a higher debt-servicing ratio for both men 
and women (Figure 1). As might be expected, this relationship is generally 
stronger for women than for men. LFP is also associated with higher levels of 
owner-occupied mortgage debt and debt-to-income ratios. 
Figure 1: LFP versus Various Measures of Owner-occupied Mortgage Debt 












































































Table 2 also shows that the value of non-housing-related debt is relatively small. 
Other debt outstanding and other debt as a ratio to household income are also 
positively correlated with increases in LFP. The vast majority of respondents have 
some assets, with median values of less than $10 000 for financial assets and 
around $200  000 for non-financial assets in the cross-section. In the panel,   
70 per cent of the sample own, or are purchasing, their own home; the median 
value of homes is approximately $200 000. 
5.  Estimation Results 
Detailed results from the cross-section and panel models for the debt and asset 
variables are presented in Sections 5.1 and 5.3 respectively. The results from our 
tests for the endogeneity of debt are discussed in Section 5.2. In general, we find 
that in both the cross-section and panel models, coefficients on the standard 
variables that typically enter into labour supply equations have the expected sign 
and are consistent with other studies.15 For example, partnered females are less 
likely to work while the opposite is true for partnered males. Those with a 
university education are significantly more likely to work, while those with poor 
health are less likely. Women with young children are significantly less likely to 
participate in the labour force, reflecting the well-known M-shaped pattern in LFP 
with peaks at ages 20–24 and 45–54, before and after the key child-rearing ages. 
For men, these effects are not so apparent. 
In line with the literature, the coefficients and marginal effects on participation are 
smaller and less significant for men than women. This finding is consistent with 
men’s greater attachment to the labour force and higher average participation rate 
(Killingsworth and Heckman 1986; Pencavel 1986; Birch 2005).16
                                           
15 Full results for the cross-section and panel models are available in Tables B1, B2, B3 and B4 
in Appendix B. 
16 In addition, due to the large proportion of men with LFP = 1, and the flattening of the probit 
curve at this upper range, it is not surprising to find smaller effects for men. 
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5.1  Cross-section Results 
Results from the cross-section probit models are shown in Tables B1 and B2 in  
Appendix B. Table 3 provides more detailed results for debt and assets; in 
particular, the marginal effects of debt and assets conditional on strictly positive 
debt holdings are given. Overall, debt has the expected positive and significant 
effect on participation. After controlling for the effects of debt, income and 
demographic characteristics, assets are not found to have a significant effect on 
participation. 
Most of the effect of owner-occupied mortgage debt is captured by the   
debt-servicing ratio, with a positive and significant effect on the probability of LFP 
for both men and women. For men, of all debt variables in the model, only the 
debt-servicing ratio has a positive and significant effect. 
For men and women, the marginal effect of the debt-servicing ratio is positive and 
significant over the relevant range of the ratio. The marginal effect shown in   
Table 3 is for an increase in the ratio of 0.1 (from its non-zero median, that is, the 
median ratio of all strictly positive ratios).17 For women, this is estimated to 
increase the probability of participation in the labour force by 0.47 percentage 
points, all other things being equal and at their median values. For men, it increases 
the propensity to participate by a much smaller 0.01 percentage points, when 
considering a man with median characteristics. 
The level of owner-occupied mortgage debt does not appear to have a significant 
effect on the probability of LFP. However, for women, the ratio of owner-occupied 
mortgage debt to income does have a positive and significant, albeit small, effect 
on LFP propensities. 
 
                                           
17 For women, an increase of that size corresponds to a movement along the distribution of 
strictly positive debt-servicing ratios from the median to around the 70
th percentile. For men, 
to induce a similar movement along the distribution, a larger increase in the ratio of 0.4  
is needed. 
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Table 3: Cross-section Estimates of the Effect of Assets and Debts on LFP 









debt outstanding   –3.62×10
–7   $98 000   $10 000  –3.96×10
–2
Owner-occupied mortgage 
debt-to-income ratio  1.66×10
–5***   1.91    0.1  1.81×10
–5*** 
Debt-servicing ratio  –2.35×10
–3***   0.22    0.1  4.73×10
–1*** 
Sq root of debt-servicing ratio  4.05×10
–1***      
Other debt outstanding   1.54×10
–6***    $3 000    $1 000  1.69×10
–2*** 
Other debt-to-income ratio  3.63×10
–5    0.08    0.1  3.97×10
–5
Financial assets   8.60×10
–9   $6 700    $1 000  9.41×10
–5
Non-financial assets  –1.09×10
–7   $212 000   $10 000  –1.19×10
–2
Observations  2 999    Pseudo R
2  0.35 
Men 
Owner-occupied mortgage 
debt outstanding   1.64×10
–6   $100 000   $10 000  4.30×10
–2
Owner-occupied mortgage 
debt-to-income ratio  9.73×10
–6  3.90    0.1  2.56×10
–6
Debt-servicing ratio  –5.29×10
–4***   0.42    0.1  1.36×10
–2*** 
Sq root of debt-servicing ratio  6.72×10
–2***       
Other debt outstanding   1.73×10
–6   $4 000    $1 000  4.55×10
–3
Other debt-to-income ratio  3.02×10
–6  0.15    0.1  7.95×10
–7
Financial assets   –2.44×10
–7   $6 800    $1 000  –6.42×10
–4
Non-financial assets  1.26×10
–7   $198 000   $10 000  3.32×10
–3
Observations  2 568    Pseudo R
2 0.48 
Notes:  ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
  (a) Marginal effects estimated at the median of strictly positive (or non-zero) owner-occupied mortgage 
debt, with other characteristics set at sample medians. See Appendix B, Tables B1 and B2 for full results. 
 
For women, the level of other debt is statistically significant. Every $1  000 of 
additional other debt is associated with a 0.02 percentage point increase in the 
probability of participation. The ratio of other debt to income is not found to have a 
significant effect on the probability of LFP. Further analyses of the predicted 
probabilities are presented in Section 6. 
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The models have reasonable explanatory power. For women, the pseudo R
2 is 0.35, 
and for men it is 0.48. The average predicted probabilities also appear reasonable; 
for women, the average predicted probability of participation is 72.3 per cent. This 
is equal to the actual proportion of the sample in the labour force. For men, the 
average predicted probability is 92.3 per cent and is also equal to the actual 
proportion of the sample in the labour force. 
For discrete choice models, Greene (2003) also suggests a summary measure of 
predictive ability based on the proportion of the sample for which labour force 
status is correctly predicted. For women, labour force status is correctly predicted 
for 82 per cent of the sample, with correct predictions for 92 per cent of those in 
the labour force and for 59 per cent of those not in the labour force. These results 
can be compared with that which would be found using a naïve model in which 
every woman is predicted to be in the labour force. Under a naïve model, correct 
predictions of participation would be made 72 per cent of the time. Thus, the 
model gives an improvement of 10 percentage points in predictive ability over the 
uninformed guess. 
For men, labour force status is correctly predicted for 95 per cent of the sample 
overall, with correct predictions for 98 per cent of those in the labour force but 
only for 50 per cent of those not in the labour force. In comparison to the naïve 
prediction, the model provides an improvement of only 3 percentage points, 
reflecting the fact that men are more likely to participate. As a result, there is less 
to gain from modelling their participation decision. 
We carried out a number of robustness checks. To account for possible   
non-linearity in the debt-servicing ratio, we replaced the debt-servicing ratio and 
its square root with a dummy variable as an indicator of large debt-servicing ratios, 
and the interaction of this dummy variable with the level of the debt-servicing 
ratio; qualitatively similar results were found. Results were also similar when each 
debt variable was winsorised at the 97.5
th percentile.18 Furthermore, when owner-
occupied mortgage debt and its ratio to income were omitted, the debt-servicing 
variables remained significant and the coefficient estimates were broadly similar. 
Removing the debt-servicing variables yielded a positive but insignificant 
                                           
18 Winsorising involved replacing data above the 97.5
th percentile of the distribution with the 
value at the 97.5
th percentile. 
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coefficient on the level of owner-occupied mortgage debt for women, while for 
men the level became significant at the 10 per cent level. 
Domeij and Flodén (2006) argue that ignoring the effects of assets and debts can 
bias coefficient estimates towards zero. We found that this may be the case. In a 
model excluding the asset and debt variables, the marginal effects of many of the 
demographic and income variables appear smaller; the debt and assets are jointly 
significant when included. 
5.2  Testing for the Endogeneity of Debt 
As described in Section 3.2, the exogeneity of debt to labour supply can be tested 
using the two-step instrumental variables approach of Rivers and Vuong (1988). 
This requires valid instruments for the six debt variables. Valid instruments must 
be correlated with debt but not with the error in the labour supply equation. 
Measures of house prices are used elsewhere in the literature as an instrumental 
variable (Bottazzi 2004). They are correlated with owner-occupied mortgage debt 
and repayments but are less likely to be correlated with current LFP. Two sources 
of house price data are available: self-reported data from HILDA for the price of 
one’s home when purchased, and postcode-matched house price data sourced from 
Australian Property Monitors (APM) for 1993.19 For the self-reported data, the 
assumption of no correlation between the house price and the error in the labour 
supply equation is less likely to hold for more forward-looking households. 
However, shocks to LFP and house prices in the years since the house purchase 
should ensure that house prices are exogenous to current LFP. 
                                           
19 The APM data provide median quarterly house and unit prices for suburbs grouped by price 
deciles for the main capital cities (Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Perth and 
Canberra). The suburbs are matched to postcode data; the postcode and price data are then 
matched to the HILDA sample. If postcodes appear in more than one of the price deciles 
(because the same postcode is often used for neighbouring suburbs), the matched prices were 
averaged to give one price per postcode. The calendar-year average of the median quarterly 
house price is used. Because data are only available for the cities listed above, around   
40 per cent of the sample is lost when these house price data are used. However, testing 
suggested that there was no systematic difference between the full sample and the sub-sample 
of those living in one of these capital cities. 
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Testing for endogeneity is conducted using each of these sources of house price 
data in turn. In each case, the house price and its square are used as instruments, 
giving two instruments. The house price as a ratio to household income (excluding 
individual labour income) provides a third instrument.20
Whether or not the house is the first home ever purchased should also influence the 
level of owner-occupied mortgage debt and repayments – with the mortgage and 
repayments likely to be higher if it is the first home because first-home buyers are 
less likely to have accumulated a substantial deposit. Indeed, the data show that 
those living in their first home ever purchased have larger debts (in levels) than  
non-first-home buyers. Moreover, whether it is their first home ever purchased or 
not should not be directly related to LFP. Thus, a categorical variable is used 
which equals 0 if the home is rented, 1 if the person is a first-home buyer and 2 
otherwise. 
In a similar manner, the year in which the house was purchased should be directly 
related to debt and repayments, as a house purchased more recently is likely to 
have a greater amount of debt outstanding on it. Again, the year of purchase should 
not be related to current LFP, particularly the further into the past the house was 
purchased. 
Other instruments considered were the initial level of owner-occupied mortgage 
debt at the start of the loan, the number of credit cards and measures of how much 
financial risk the individual is willing to take. The first of these was found to offer 
little additional independent variation beyond that of the house price when 
purchased. The number of credit cards and the measures of willingness to take 
financial risk were judged to be invalid as the number of credit cards is likely to be 
related to LFP just as debt is, while the appetite for risk may be influenced by 
whether they have a job as well as their job security. 
                                           
20 The denominator, household income (excluding individual labour income), should also be 
exogenous to the individual’s current LFP as it is household income excluding the 
individual’s earned income. 
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To test for endogeneity, the order condition must be satisfied; the number of 
instruments must be at least equal to the number of endogenous variables. Since 
only five instruments are available and there are six potentially endogenous debt 
variables, subsets of the debt variables were tested for endogeneity while the 
remaining debt variables were assumed exogenous or omitted. First, one debt 
variable was assumed endogenous, while the remaining five were assumed 
exogenous or omitted. Instruments were chosen if they were significant in the 
reduced-form debt equation (Equation (3)) at the 5 per cent level. When more than 
one instrument was relevant, overidentifying restrictions were tested using 
generalised residuals (Gourieroux et al 1987). Next, the exogeneity of relevant 
pairs of debt variables were tested; owner-occupied mortgage debt and its ratio to 
income, other debt and its ratio, and debt-servicing ratio with its square root. In this 
case, two or more instruments needed to be relevant. Similarly, the procedure was 
repeated for groups of three endogenous debt variables and then four. 
The overidentification tests pointed to valid instruments in a large number of cases, 
although the instruments were generally weaker for owner-occupied mortgage debt 
to income, other debt to income and the debt-servicing ratio, particularly for men. 
Potentially, the instruments were weaker for the debt-servicing ratio because those 
making excess repayments were more likely to be in the labour force. When two or 
more variables were assumed endogenous, the overidentification test was less 
likely to suggest valid instruments. 
For both men and women, the evidence suggests that debt is exogenous to labour 
supply when using either the self-reported data or postcode-matched house price 
data.21 That is, it appears that increased indebtedness induces greater participation, 
while the reverse effect, that greater current participation leads to higher 
indebtedness, is not found to be statistically significant.22 A caveat is that this 
                                           
21  Endogeneity tests were also carried out on a sub-sample of younger women (aged   
25–35 years) using the self-reported house price data. Young people are more likely to be 
making joint decisions on debt, LFP and family formation – Del Boca and Lusardi (2003) also 
separately examine younger women. However, the evidence suggests that debt is also 
exogenous for the sub-sample of younger women. 
22 Fortin (1993) also found mortgage debt to be exogenous to labour supply for partnered 
women in Canada. 
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result is conditional on the instrumental variables methodology.23 In addition, the 
result may reflect the fact that borrowing decisions associated with large purchases 
are often re-examined only infrequently and, therefore, that they are largely   
pre-determined when making current LFP decisions. Also, while our model 
accounts for the spouse’s labour force status, we are essentially modelling the 
individual. In order to obtain a loan (or increase debt), a bank would examine the 
circumstances of the household overall, and our model may not adequately   
capture this. 
Overall, since the explanators are generally exogenous, the probit estimates of 
Section 5.1 are preferred over the less efficient instrumental variables estimates of 
this section (for brevity, these results are not presented). 
5.3  Panel Results 
This section details the panel data results, which control for individual 
heterogeneity but assume that debt can be treated as exogenous. Full results from 
the panel models are shown in Tables B3 and B4 in Appendix B. Table 4 presents 
the estimates of the coefficients on owner-occupied mortgage debt and assets using 
both the random- and fixed-effects estimation methodologies. The random-effects 
estimates are preferred: they are estimated on the full sample rather than on the 
subset of those who have changed labour force status at least once during the 
sample period and, unlike fixed-effects, random-effects allows an examination of 
the marginal effects and associated predicted probabilities of participation. 
The random-effects estimates show that owner-occupied mortgage debt has a 
significant positive effect on the LFP decision (Table 4). The level of   
owner-occupied mortgage debt is an important influence and its coefficient is 
highly significant and positive.  The debt-servicing ratio also has a significant 
impact on participation, as in the cross-section results. The value of the   
owner-occupied home, a measure of housing assets, is not significant. Estimates  
                                           
23 An alternative approach is to model LFP and indebtedness in a simultaneous equation 
framework. Del Boca and Lusardi (2003) estimate such a model and find a marginally 
significant effect of participation on the likelihood of having a mortgage. However, they were 
able to exploit an exogenous change in the institutional structure of the Italian mortgage 
market in order to identify the direction of causality, while we have been unable to identify 
any exogenous variation to use for identification in the Australian case. 
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of the marginal effects are also shown in Table 4. For each of the four   
owner-occupied mortgage debt variables, the marginal effects are reported 
according to a reasonable increase in the respective debt variables from their non-
zero medians (the exact units are indicated in the table; all other variables, 
including the value of the owner-occupied home, are set at the sample median). 
Table 4: Panel Estimates of the Effect of Housing Debt on LFP 





































Square root of  
debt-servicing ratio  2.92×10
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Number of women 
 13  672 
 3  350 
       13  672 
 3  350 
























Square root of  
debt-servicing ratio 
3.13×10











Number of men 
 11  374 
 2  822 
       11  374 
 2  822 
 1  018 
 253 
Notes:  ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
  (a) Marginal effects estimated at the median of strictly positive (or non-zero) owner-occupied mortgage 
debt, with other characteristics set at sample medians. See Appendix B, Tables B3 and B4 for full results. 
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The marginal effects for the debt-servicing ratio are statistically significant, 
although small. The effects are smaller than those found in the cross-section 
model, although a direct comparison is difficult to make as the methodology differs 
and the non-housing debt and asset variables are not available in the panel. 
Nonetheless, as was the case for the cross-section results, the marginal effect of the 
ratio is smaller for men than for women. 
For a woman with median characteristics, the marginal effect of an increase in the 
debt-servicing ratio of 0.1 from the non-zero median of 0.22 is estimated to 
increase the probability of participation in the labour force by 0.01 percentage 
points, other things being equal. For a man with median characteristics, an increase 
of 0.1 in the ratio is estimated to increase the probability of participation by   
0.0004 percentage points. Further interpretation of the results is offered in   
Section 6. 
The conditional fixed-effects logit estimates are imprecisely estimated, potentially 
due to the much smaller sample size. The exception is the level of owner-occupied 
mortgage debt for men, where a positive and significant effect is found. Although 
the coefficient on this variable is similar to the random-effects estimate, the 
Hausman test for the consistency of the random-effects logit favours the   
fixed-effects logit estimates for both men and women.24 Nevertheless, for the 
reasons discussed in Section 3.3, the random-effects estimates are preferred. 
The random-effects models fit the data reasonably well. For women, labour force 
status is correctly predicted for 82 per cent of the sample overall; an improvement 
of 9 percentage points in comparison with the naïve predictor. For men, labour 
force status is correctly predicted for 95 per cent of the sample overall, 
representing an improvement of 3 percentage points in comparison with the naïve 
prediction. Also, the average predicted probabilities from the model are close to 
the actual proportions of those participating. For women, the average predicted 
                                           
24 A Chamberlain random-effects probit was also estimated (Wooldridge 2002). It assumes that 
the correlation between the unobserved individual effect and the explanatory variables follows 
a conditional normal distribution with a linear expectation and constant variance, rather than 
assuming that they are independent. The Chamberlain model also rejects the traditional 
random-effects estimates, although for women the debt-servicing ratio retains its significant 
positive effect on participation, and for men the level of home loan debt outstanding also 
remains significant and positive. The results are available from the authors on request. 
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probability is around 77 per cent for the random-effects models compared to   
73 per cent of the sample that reports being in the labour force. For men, these 
figures are 94 per cent and 92 per cent respectively. 
Some sensitivity tests were undertaken to ascertain whether attrition over the 
sample period influenced the results. For women, some simple tests suggested by 
Verbeek and Nijman (1992) imply that attrition over the waves is not having a 
significant effect on our estimates. For men, the same tests suggest that attrition 
may have some influence on the results, but results from estimation over a 
balanced sub-panel were qualitatively similar. 
Much of the empirical literature focuses exclusively on home owners’ labour 
supply response to debt. Renters face a down-payment constraint and so are likely 
to need to work before obtaining a mortgage. Thus, using the sub-sample of home 
owners, 70 per cent of the total sample in this case, may yield stronger results for 
the debt coefficients. However, the results (not reported) show that this was not the 
case; for both the random- and fixed-effects models, the coefficients remained 
largely unchanged, although for women, the level of owner-occupied mortgage 
debt became insignificant. 
The literature also assumes that partnered women have greater flexibility in their 
participation decisions, and so their response to changes in debt would be larger 
than the response of single women. The models were re-estimated using the sample 
of partnered women. While the debt-servicing ratio coefficients were smaller and 
became insignificant, the coefficient on owner-occupied mortgage debt increased 
and retained its significance. Thus, changing the sub-sample to be consistent with 
other studies made little qualitative difference to the results. 
6.  Discussion 
In addition to examining the estimated marginal effects of the debt and asset 
variables individually, the change in the predicted probability of participation in 
response to a change in a range of the household balance sheet variables is also of 
interest. These balance sheet variables can be expected to move together and 
sometimes by much larger increments than those used to calculate the marginal 
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effects in Sections 5.1 and 5.3 above. Table 5 shows the difference between the 
predicted probabilities of participation for two women, where one has housing debt 
and the other does not, using the results from both the cross-section and the panel 
random-effects probits. 
For example, take two ‘median’ women; one purchases a $200 000 house using 
$20 000 of her existing assets as a 10 per cent deposit, while the other simply holds 
the $20 000 in financial assets.25 The purchaser has owner-occupied mortgage debt 
of $180 000 and a corresponding debt-to-income ratio of 4.5 and debt-servicing 
ratio of 0.36 (assuming a 25-year loan at 6.5 per cent interest26). Her non-financial 
assets (or the value of the owner-occupied home for the panel) are now higher as a 
result of the house purchase, totalling $200 000. Other than for the given criteria, 
the two women are assumed to have median characteristics.27
Using the cross-section estimates, the purchaser, with a partner who is in the labour 
force and who has a child between the ages of 0 and 4 years, has a propensity to 
participate that is 6.2 percentage points higher than it is for the woman without 
debt, a statistically significant difference. For the panel estimates, the difference is 
smaller, but still statistically significant, at 3.3 percentage points. 
                                           
25 Among those living in a capital city, the median owner-occupied home is valued at $200 000 
in 2002. The median value rises to $250 000 in the panel sample; however the results are not 
qualitatively different when that value is applied in the scenario. 
26 The interest rate of 6.5 per cent reflects the 2001–2005 average rate paid on outstanding 
mortgages. 
27 These ‘median’ women are 38 years of age, have not finished Year 12, have spent 14 years in 
and 1 year out of the labour force, are proficient at English, Australian born, living in a capital 
city, do not have a health condition that adversely affects their ability to work, have zero 
investment income, receive no family tax benefits and have $40 000 of household income 
(excluding their own). For the cross-section analysis, they are assumed to have household 
other debt of $3 000 and an other debt-to-income ratio of 0.075. Financial assets are set equal 
to the median of $6 700 for the purchaser, and to $26 700 for the non-purchaser who does not 
use the $20 000 as the deposit for a house. 
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The difference in the effects across the panel and cross-section estimates may 
indicate that the cross-section results are biased because they ignore unobserved 
individual heterogeneity. However, data on other debt and non-owner-occupied 
housing assets are not available for the panel. These omissions may mean that the 
effect of owner-occupied mortgage debt on participation propensities is harder to 
estimate precisely. 
Table 5 also shows that the difference in the propensity to participate between the 
two ‘median’ women is moderated if the women have a university degree or have 
no children, as each of these characteristics in and of themselves would make both 
women more likely to participate. 
Table 5: Difference in Predicted Probabilities With and Without  
Owner-occupied Housing debt 
Women, percentage points 
 Has  children 
aged 0–4 years 
Has no children 
Cross-section probit 
Has a partner; spouse is in the labour force  6.2**  1.3* 
  – also has a university degree  5.6**  0.4 
Single 6.0**  1.5* 
  – also has a university degree  5.9**  0.5* 
Panel random-effects probit 
Has a partner; spouse is in the labour force  3.3*  0.1 
  – also has a university degree  1.4*  0.0 
Single 3.4*  0.2 
  – also has a university degree  1.6*  0.0 
Note:  ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
 
A similar analysis can be conducted for men. However, while the house purchase 
does imply a greater propensity to participate, a significant difference is only found 
for single men with no children and with only a basic level of education. 
In comparison to the size of the marginal effect associated with a small change in 
just one of the debt variables, this analysis shows a larger net effect for a 
reasonable shift in a set of assets and debts associated with a house purchase. 
Nevertheless, for women, the positive effect of the house purchase on the 
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propensity to participate does not offset the strong negative effect on participation 
of having a young child (results not reported). This is consistent with results found 
for the UK (Bottazzi 2004), but is in contrast to results found for the Netherlands 
(Aldershof et al 1999) and Canada (Fortin 1995). 
The model estimates can also be used to make some ‘back-of-the-envelope- 
calculations’ about the effect of indebtedness on aggregate LFP. That is, a measure 
of the contribution of the recently observed increases in household indebtedness to 
the observed change in LFP can be roughly estimated. To do this, the average 
predicted probability of participation in the labour force, with debts and the value 
of the owner-occupied home set equal to their 1998/99 median (from the 
Household Expenditure Survey (HES)), is compared to the predicted probability of 
participation when debts and the value of the owner-occupied home are set equal to 
their 2005 median (from the HILDA Survey data). To keep the exercise relatively 
simple, all those with positive owner-occupied mortgage debt are assigned the   
non-zero median value of debts and assets.28
Table 6 shows that the average predicted probability of participation across all 
women (both with and without owner-occupied mortgage debt) is 77.2 per cent in 
1998/99 and 78.6 per cent in 2005 (columns I and III, row 3), an increase of 
1.4 percentage points. This is smaller than the actual increase of 4.4 percentage 
points in the aggregate LFP rate between 1998/99 and 2005 for women aged 25–54 
(ABS 2006). That is, the model attributes around one-third of the rise in aggregate 
LFP rates as being due to the rise in debt. 
Table 6 also allows an investigation of the likely source of this predicted increase 
in the probability of participation. The analysis suggests that the increase in the 
level of indebtedness has had little practical effect on the predicted probability of 
LFP. For women, among those with debt, the predicted probability of participation 
actually decreased slightly from 83.9 per cent in 1998/99 to 83.5 per cent in 2005 
                                           
28 The estimated coefficients from the panel random-effects probit are used to generate predicted 
probabilities for 1998/99 and 2005 with all demographic, family and income characteristics 
held constant at their 2005 values. 
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(columns I and III, row 2).29 Instead, the analysis suggests that the change in the 
probability of participation, and thereby some part of the increase in the aggregate 
LFP rate, is likely to be due to a compositional effect associated with the increase 
in the proportion of those with owner-occupied mortgage debt (from around   
38 per cent of households to just over 50 per cent of households). 
Table 6: Change in LFP Using Debt from HES and HILDA 
  1998/99 2005 
 Average  predicted 
percentage in the 
labour force 
Actual percentage
of the sample with 
and without debt
Average predicted 
percentage in the 
labour force 
Actual percentage 
of the sample with 
and without debt
 I  II  III  IV 
Women 
Has no debt  73.0  61.8  73.1  47.3 
Has median debt  83.9  38.2  83.5  52.7 
Total 77.2        78.6   
Men 
Has no debt  89.6  61.1  89.4  46.8 
Has median debt  97.0  38.9  96.4  53.2 
Total 92.5      93.1   
 
For men, the aggregate LFP rate has fallen by 0.4 percentage points over the same 
period. In contrast, the model predicts that changes in debt and asset values imply 
an increase in the average probability of participation of 0.6 percentage points 
(columns I and III, row 6). This suggests that despite an increase in the proportion 
of those with owner-occupied mortgage debt, other factors have dominated and 
have driven the participation rate down between 1998/99 and 2005. 
To assess whether or not the magnitude of the predicted increase is reasonable, it 
can be compared to the size of the predicted increase in LFP associated with a 
change in the proportions of individuals with different levels of education, a 
change which is widely accepted to have had a strong effect on participation
                                           
29 For those without debt, the average predicted percentage in the labour force is around   
73 per cent for women in 1998/99 and 2005 (columns I and III, row 1). These predicted 
probabilities should be quite similar by construction as only the asset value of the   
owner-occupied home varies. 
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propensities. Between 1998/99 and 2005, the proportion of individuals with 
tertiary education has increased, and the predicted effect on LFP (based on the  
random-effects model) is estimated to be an increase of 2.3 percentage points for 
women and 1.0 percentage point for men in this age group. 
7.  Conclusions 
This paper examines the extent to which rising household indebtedness has led to 
higher labour force participation among prime-age Australians. Data from the 
HILDA Survey are used as it contains recent and detailed data on household 
wealth along with extensive labour market and demographic data. 
A cross-section probit model is estimated using detailed measures of household 
debt and assets. In addition, a panel model, using only measures of owner-occupied 
housing debt and assets, is estimated over 2001–2005. The panel results suggest 
that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity across individuals is important when 
examining the influence of debt on labour supply. 
The potential two-way relationship between debt and labour supply is investigated 
using an instrumental variables approach as the identification strategy. The tests 
suggest that, statistically, debt is exogenous to current labour force participation. 
However, the results generally suggest that indebtedness increases the probability 
of participating in the labour force, particularly as households have a commitment 
to meet the ongoing servicing obligation of that debt. Despite the finding of 
statistical significance, the size of the estimated effect of debt on participation 
depends on the characteristics of the individuals being considered. The results 
suggest larger effects for women with young children than those without, and 
much smaller effects again for men. This ordering mirrors generally accepted 
conceptions of these groups’ respective attachment to the labour force. 
While the marginal effects appear modest, it is important to remember that large, 
discrete changes in debt holdings are not uncommon, for example, those associated 
with the purchase of a new home. This means that the predicted probabilities (as 
presented in Section 6) are likely to provide a more meaningful guide than 
marginal effect estimates. For example, these results suggest that a woman with 
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young children who purchases a $200 000 home and takes on a commensurate 
amount of debt will have a propensity to participate that is, on average,   
3.3–6.2 percentage points higher than the same woman without debt. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Table A1: Variable Definitions (continued next page) 
Variable Description 
Labour force participation  Equal to 1 if participating in the labour force – i.e., working or  
unemployed – and equal to 0 if not in the labour force 
Household income  
(excluding individual  
labour income) 
Annual gross household income excluding the individual’s labour income 
but including the partner’s (and other family members’) labour income. It is 
not used separately in any estimation but is used as the denominator in the 




Sum of all outstanding debt on owner-occupied home – imputed value for 
the cross-section but reported values for the panel 
Owner-occupied mortgage 
debt-to-income 
Ratio of owner-occupied mortgages outstanding to household income 
(excluding individual labour income). Set equal to 0 if there is no owner-
occupied mortgage debt outstanding and to the level of debt if household 
income (excluding individual labour income) is 0. 
Other debt outstanding  Sum of imputed other property, total credit card, HECS (Higher Education 
Contribution Scheme – a loan for higher education repayable contingent on 
income) and other household debts 
Other debt-to-income  Ratio of other debt outstanding to household income (excluding individual 
labour income). Set equal to 0 if there is no other debt outstanding and to 
the level of debt if household income (excluding individual labour income) 
is 0. 
Debt-servicing ratio  Annual actual repayments on first and second owner-occupied mortgages 
divided by the household income (excluding individual labour income). 
Note that actual repayments can be in excess of required repayments. Set 
equal to 0 if there is no outstanding owner-occupied mortgage debt and to 
the repayment if household income (excluding individual labour income)  
is 0. 
Value of owner-occupied 
home 
Self-reported value of the owner-occupied home 
Non-financial assets  Sum of imputed home value, other property values, vehicles and 
collectibles 
Financial assets  Sum of imputed equity and cash investments, trust funds and household 
bank accounts 
Investment income  Imputed financial year income from investments 
Other income  The annual sum of private pension (superannuation and worker’s 
compensation) and foreign income, other household income (total gross 
household income less personal gross income), and private transfers (child 
support and other regular private income). 
Family Tax Benefit A  Imputed annual amount of Family Tax Benefit A that would be received by 
the household assuming no labour income was received by the individual 
Family Tax Benefit B  Imputed annual amount of Family Tax Benefit B that would be received by 
the household assuming no labour income was received by the individual 
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Table A1: Variable Definitions (continued) 
Variable Description 
Age  Age previous birthday as at June 30 
Age
2 Age squared 
Years in the labour force  The sum of years spent in paid work and looking for work 
Years in the labour force
2 Years in the labour force squared 
Years not in the labour  
force 
The number of years spent not working and not looking for work 
Years not in the labour  
force
2
Years not in the labour force squared 
University educated  Equal to 1 if has a postgraduate degree, graduate diploma or certificate, or 
bachelor degree, 0 otherwise 
Has a diploma  Equal to 1 if has an advanced diploma or certificates, 0 otherwise 
High school qualification  Equal to 1 if high school is highest qualification, 0 otherwise 
Did not finish Year 12  Equal to 1 if has not completed Year 12, 0 otherwise 
Married or de facto  Equal to 1 if married or de facto, 0 otherwise 
Single  Equal to 1 if single, widowed, divorced or separated, 0 otherwise 
Spouse’s labour force status  Equal to 1 if spouse is participating in the labour force, 0 otherwise 
Has child aged 0–4 years  Equal to 1 if has one or more own resident children aged 0–4 years,  
0 otherwise 
Has child aged 5–14 years  Equal to 1 if has one or more own resident children aged 5–14 years,  
0 otherwise 
Has child aged 15–24 years  Equal to 1 if has one or more own resident children aged 15–24 years,  
0 otherwise 
Has child aged 25 years  
or older 
Equal to 1 if has one or more own resident children aged 25 years or older, 
0 otherwise 
Has children aged 0–4  
and 5–14 years 
Equal to 1 if has one or more own resident children 0–4 years and one or 
more own resident children 5–14 years, 0 otherwise 
Has health condition  Equal to 1 if long-term health conditions or a disability limit the type or 
amount of work, 0 otherwise  
Speaks English well  Equal to 1 if English is spoken at home or if it is spoken well or very well 
(self-reported), 0 otherwise 
Australian born  Equal to 1 if born in Australia, 0 otherwise 
Born in an English- 
speaking country 
Equal to 1 if born in Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, United 
Kingdom or United States of America, 0 otherwise 
Born in a non-English- 
speaking country 
Equal to 1 if born in another country, 0 otherwise 
Resides in a capital city  Equal to 1 if resides in a capital city (excluding Hobart and Darwin) or the 
Australian Capital Territory, 0 otherwise 
Resides in a major city  Equal to 1 if resides in a major or inner regional city other than a capital 
(including Hobart and Darwin), 0 otherwise 
Resides in a rural area  Equal to 1 if resides in a regional or remote area, 0 otherwise 34 
Table A2: Sample Summary Statistics – Women 
  Cross-section 2002; 
2 999 observations 
Panel 2001–2005; 
13 672 observations 
  Mean  Std dev  Mean  Std dev 
Labour force participation  0.72  0.45  0.73  0.45 
Owner-occupied mortgage debt outstanding ($m) 0.06  0.09  0.07  0.11 
Owner-occupied mortgage debt-to-income  1 538.37  16 053.02  2 199.02  21 095.90 
Debt-servicing ratio  168.57  1 640.33  212.62  1 937.60 
Other debt outstanding ($m)  0.03  0.08     
Other debt-to-income  528.16  9 204.50     
Value of owner-occupied home ($m)  0.21  0.25  0.25  0.29 
Non-financial assets ($m)  0.29  0.43     
Financial assets ($m)  0.05  0.24     
Investment income ($’000)  0.81 7.16 1.07 7.87 
Other income ($’000)  45.83 47.39 47.69 49.13 
Family Tax Benefit A ($’000)  2.80 3.68 3.01 3.92 
Family Tax Benefit B ($’000)  1.20 1.12 1.30 1.18 
Age 37.71  7.14  38.63  7.26 
Years in the labour force  15.29  7.85  16.02  7.99 
Years not in the labour force  5.79  6.42  5.89  6.52 
University educated  0.26  0.44  0.27  0.44 
Has a diploma  0.24  0.43  0.25  0.43 
High school qualification  0.17  0.37  0.16  0.37 
Did not finish Year 12  0.33  0.47  0.32  0.47 
Married or de facto  0.73  0.44  0.73  0.44 
Spouse’s labour force status  0.62  0.48  0.63  0.48 
Has child aged 0–4 years  0.24  0.43  0.24  0.43 
Has child aged 5–14 years  0.45  0.50  0.45  0.50 
Has child aged 15–24 years  0.23  0.42  0.24  0.43 
Has child aged 25 years or older  0.01  0.10  0.01  0.12 
Has children aged 0–4 and 5–14 years  0.13  0.33  0.12  0.33 
Has health condition  0.11  0.31  0.13  0.33 
Speaks English well
  0.98 0.14 0.98  0.12 
Australian born  0.77  0.42  0.78  0.42 
Born in an English-speaking country  0.09  0.29  0.09  0.29 
Born in a non-English-speaking country  0.14  0.34  0.13  0.34 
Resides in a capital city  0.60  0.49  0.60  0.49 
Resides in a major city  0.27  0.44  0.28  0.45 
Resides in a rural area  0.12  0.33  0.12  0.33 35 
Table A3: Sample Summary Statistics – Men 
  Cross-section 2002; 
2 568 observations 
Panel 2001–2005; 
11 374 observations 
  Mean  Std dev  Mean  Std dev 
Labour force participation  0.92  0.27  0.92  0.27 
Owner-occupied mortgage debt outstanding ($m) 0.06  0.09  0.07  0.12 
Owner-occupied mortgage debt-to-income  2 272.33  18 611.35  3 713.43  28 690.10 
Debt-servicing ratio  259.77  1 898.73  352.88  2 573.39 
Other debt outstanding ($m)  0.03  0.09     
Other debt-to-income  1 411.24  15 497.29     
Value of owner-occupied home ($m)  0.20  0.24  0.24  0.27 
Non-financial assets ($m)  0.28  0.41     
Financial assets ($m)  0.04  0.18     
Investment income ($’000)  1.22  8.34  1.83  14.27 
Other income ($’000)  26.62 28.18  27.25  29.40 
Family Tax Benefit A ($’000)  2.12 3.32  2.30  3.53 
Family Tax Benefit B ($’000)  0.98 1.12  1.09  1.20 
Age 37.75  7.19  38.75  7.26 
Years in the labour force  19.63  7.92  20.51  7.98 
Years not in the labour force  1.40  3.04  1.46  3.12 
University educated  0.25  0.43  0.26  0.44 
Has a diploma  0.40  0.49  0.41  0.49 
High school qualification  0.11  0.32  0.11  0.31 
Did not finish Year 12  0.24  0.42  0.22  0.42 
Married or de facto  0.71  0.45  0.73  0.44 
Spouse’s labour force status  0.50  0.50  0.52  0.50 
Has child aged 0–4 years  0.22  0.41  0.22  0.42 
Has child aged 5–14 years  0.33  0.47  0.34  0.47 
Has child aged 15–24 years  0.15  0.36  0.16  0.36 
Has child aged 25 years or older  0.00  0.06  0.01  0.07 
Has children aged 0–4 years and 5–14  0.09  0.29  0.09  0.29 
Has health condition  0.11  0.32  0.13  0.34 
Speaks English well  0.99  0.12  0.99  0.10 
Australian born  0.78  0.42  0.78  0.41 
Born in an English-speaking country  0.11  0.31  0.11  0.31 
Born in a non-English-speaking country  0.12  0.32  0.11  0.31 
Resides in a capital city  0.60  0.49  0.60  0.49 
Resides in a major city  0.28  0.45  0.28  0.45 
Resides in a rural area  0.12  0.33  0.12  0.33 
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Appendix B: Tables of Results 
Table B1: Cross-section LFP Model Results – Women (continued next page) 
  Coefficients  Median  Selected unit  Marginal effects 
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Years in the labour force  0.067*** 
(0.024) 
 14.08   1  year  –0.001 
(0.003) 
Years in the labour force
2 –0.003*** 
(0.000) 
    




 4    1  year  –0.020*** 
(0.003) 
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Table B1: Cross-section LFP Model Results – Women (continued) 
  Coefficients  Median  Selected unit  Marginal effects 
at the median 
University educated  0.609*** 
(0.098) 
0  Compared to did  
not finish Year 12 
0.053*** 
(0.017) 
Has a diploma  0.194** 
(0.079) 
0  Compared to did  
not finish Year 12 
0.023** 
(0.011) 
High school qualification  0.151 
(0.094) 
0  Compared to did  
not finish Year 12 
0.019 
(0.013) 
Married or de facto  –0.182* 
(0.108) 
1  Compared to single  –0.022* 
(0.013) 
Spouse’s labour force status  0.291*** 
(0.093) 
1  Compared to spouse  
not in the labour force 
0.049** 
(0.020) 
Has child aged 0–4 years  –1.944*** 
(0.156) 
0  Compared to no children 
aged 0–4 years 
–0.614*** 
(0.045) 
Has child aged 5–14 years  –0.348*** 
(0.115) 
0  Compared to no children 
aged 5–14 years 
–0.061*** 
(0.021) 
Has child aged 15–24 years  0.284*** 
(0.085) 
0  Compared to no children 
aged 15–24 years 
0.032*** 
(0.012) 




0  Compared to no children 
aged 25 years or older 
–0.003 
(0.033) 
Has children aged 0–4  
and 5–14 years 
1.011*** 
(0.148) 
0  Compared to no children 
aged 0–4 or 5–14 years 
0.066*** 
(0.018) 
Has health condition   –0.898*** 
(0.093) 




Speaks English well  0.525** 
(0.255) 
1  Compared to does not 
speak English well 
0.103 
(0.066) 
Australian born  0.181* 
(0.097) 












Resides in a major city  0.038 
(0.072) 




Resides in a rural area  0.060 
(0.100) 










 2  999 
 0.35 
    
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent
levels respectively. 
  (a) Marginal effect cannot be measured at zero due to the square root. 
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Table B2: Cross-section LFP Model Results – Men (continued next page) 
  Coefficients  Median  Selected unit  Marginal effects 
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Years in the labour force  –0.068 
(0.058) 
 19.28    1  year  –0.002 
(0.002) 
Years in the labour force
2 0.000 
(0.001) 
    




 0    1  year  –0.012*** 
(0.002) 





    
University educated  0.830*** 
(0.192) 
  0  Compared to did  
not finish Year 12 
0.015* 
(0.009) 
Has a diploma  0.257** 
(0.124) 
  0  Compared to did  




Table B2: Cross-section LFP Model Results – Men (continued) 
  Coefficients  Median  Selected unit  Marginal effects 
at the median 
High school qualification  0.209 
(0.191) 
0  Compared to did  
not finish Year 12 
0.007 
(0.007) 
Married or de facto  0.282* 
(0.165) 
1  Compared to single  0.016* 
(0.009) 
Spouse’s labour force status  0.434*** 
(0.148) 
0  Compared to spouse not in 
the labour force 
0.012 
(0.007) 
Has child aged 0–4 years  –0.241 
(0.277) 
0  Compared to no children 
aged 0–4 years 
–0.013 
(0.018) 
Has child aged 5–14 years  –0.038 
(0.200) 
0  Compared to no children 
aged 5–14 years 
–0.002 
(0.009) 
Has child aged 15–24 years  0.051 
(0.166) 
0  Compared to no children 
aged 15–24 years 
0.002 
(0.006) 




0  Compared to no children 
aged 25 years or older 
0.006 
(0.013) 
Has children aged 0–4  
and 5–14 years 
0.534 
(0.344) 
0  Compared to no children 
aged 0–4 or 5–14 years 
0.013* 
(0.008) 
Has health condition   –1.249*** 
(0.113) 




Speaks English well  –0.163 
(0.378) 
1  Compared to does not 
speak English well 
–0.006 
(0.012) 
Australian born  0.175 
(0.173) 












Resides in a major city  0.043 
(0.121) 
0  Compared to living  
in a capital city 
0.002 
(0.005) 
Resides in a rural area  –0.225 
(0.144) 
0  Compared to living  











    
Notes:   Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent
levels respectively.
 
  (a) Marginal effect cannot be measured at zero due to the square root.  
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Table B3: Panel LFP Model Results – Women (continued next page) 
  Probit random effects  Logit coefficients 
 
 












































































































































































Years in the labour force  0.136*** 
(0.025) 






Years in the labour force
2 –0.004*** 
(0.001) 























University educated  1.039*** 
(0.104) 






Has a diploma  0.381*** 
(0.085) 






High school qualification  0.279*** 
(0.103) 






Married or de facto  –0.300*** 
(0.099) 







Table B3: Panel LFP Model Results – Women (continued) 
  Probit random effects  Logit coefficients 






















































Has children aged 0–4  































































































Cases (number of individuals) 
 13  672 
 3  350      13  672 
 3  350 
 3  375 
 890 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels 
respectively. 
  (a) Marginal effects shown are for the selected units shown in Table B1. 
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Table B4: Panel LFP Model Results – Men (continued next page) 
  Probit random effects  Logit coefficients 
 
 












































































































































































Years in the labour force  0.006 
(0.041) 






Years in the labour force
2 0.000 
(0.001) 
























(b) University educated  1.260*** 
(0.168) 




Has a diploma  0.303*** 
(0.112) 






High school qualification  0.290* 
(0.172) 






Married or de facto  0.452*** 
(0.133) 







Table B4: Panel LFP Model Results – Men (continued) 
  Probit random effects  Logit coefficients 





















































Has children aged 0–4  































































































Cases (number of individuals) 
 11  374 
 2  822 
     11  374 
 2  822 
 1  018 
 253 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels
respectively. 
(a) Marginal effects shown are for the selected units shown in Table B1. 
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Queensland: Underlying data for Queensland are copyrighted to State of Queensland for which 
no responsibility is accepted. 
South Australia: Copyright in this information belongs to the South Australian Government and 
the South Australian Government does not accept any responsibility for the accuracy or 
completeness of the information or its suitability for any purpose.  
Victoria: Some underlying Victorian information is © State of Victoria (Department of 
Sustainability and Environment). Accuracy not warranted. Use is on the basis that the State of 
Victoria shall bear no responsibility or liability whatsoever for any errors, faults, defects or 
omissions in that information. 
Western Australia: Copyright – The State of Western Australia (DOLA), (2004). Licence No. 
PA75-2003. Based on information provided with the permission of DOLA. 
Australian Capital Territory: The ACT data are the property of the Australian Capital Territory. 
No part of them may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, 
photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted 
without prior written permission. Enquiries should be directed to: The Executive Director, ACT 
Planning and Land Management GPO Box 1908 CANBERRA ACT 2601. 
 